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We address two empirical questions about divorce in postwar Japan:  Why is the divorce rate so low compared to 
other industrialized economies?  And, Why is it rising?  We examine patterns of marriage and divorce as a 
process of institutional change, and discuss how the rising divorce rate in Japan is an outcome of the dynamic 
interactions between economic development and demographic change at the macro-level, and changes in social 
norms and attitudes that govern the behavior of individuals at the micro-level.   
 
The divorce rate in Japan is rising because there is a tradeoff between marital stability and gender equality.  The 
drive towards equal status between the sexes narrows the dependency between the spouses, and offsets the costs 
and benefits of marriage.  Lower dependency allows greater voice, and lowers the cost of exiting a marriage.  
The diversity of family forms such as civil unions and cohabitation allows couples to choose alternatives to 
marriage, which in turn weakens the institution of marriage.  Alternatively, the divorce rate in Japan is low 
compared to the U.S. and Europe because dependency between the spouses is greater, alternatives to marriage 
are fewer, and the legacy of the traditional gender division of labor continues to influence the actions and 
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  The rising divorce rate is a universal feature among industrialized societies, and a 
natural consequence of economic development and social change.  The pursuit of greater 
equality between the sexes, the availability of alternative arrangements to marriage, and the 
increasing role of the government in providing welfare for families offset the costs and 
benefits of marriage.  Macro-level changes that affect the economic activities of the society 
may influence the actions of individuals at the micro-level through the strengthening or 
weakening of social norms, social relationships, and cultural attributes. 
  This chapter examines the changes in the patterns of marriage and divorce in 
contemporary Japanese society.  In 2003, the divorce rate in Japan reached an all-time high in 
the postwar period.  There are no signs that the divorce rate will decline in the foreseeable 
future.  This social trend seems incongruous with the behavior of the Japanese who have 
traditionally valued harmony, loyalty and long-term commitments.  Paralleling the decline of 
lifetime employment in Japan, the media, in particular the Western media, are quick to point 
out that the rising divorce rate symbolizes a cultural shift, and the demise of traditional values.  
But the increasing patterns of marital disruption is a universal phenomenon among the 
industrialized societies, and certainly not unique to Japan.  What is more surprising and often 
overlooked is the fact that the divorce rate in Japan still remains low among the industrialized 
economies.   
  A better understanding of marriage and divorce in Japan therefore requires separating 
the two questions, i.e.:  Why is the divorce rate in Japan low by international standards?  And, 
Why is it rising? 
  Studying the changing patterns of marriage is a study of institutional change.  It 
cannot be done in isolation but rather requires a thorough examination of its complementary 
institutions, and their influence on individual actions.  We first briefly examine the background factors governing gender relationships in postwar Japan.  We then discuss why 
divorce happens and why it doesn’t in contemporary Japan. 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOR IN 
POSTWAR JAPAN 
  Economic development in postwar Japan was achieved under the implicit assumption 
that the traditional division of labor between the sexes was the optimal condition for growth.  
The practice of lifetime employment which flourished in the postwar period strongly favored 
men over women.  The extensive training, generous benefits and internal promotion that 
characterized the internal labor market in Japan were only available to workers who were able 
to make long-term commitments.  Women, who were expected to make commitments to their 
families, were effectively excluded from taking up positions in the internal labor market.  
Women’s employment opportunities were thus mainly restricted to the secondary labor 
market characterized by dead-end jobs, or short-term temporary jobs, and their contribution to 
the household finance was strictly secondary to their husbands.   
  Lifetime employment therefore reinforced the specialization between the sexes.  
Since the desirable jobs were unavailable for most women, their incentive to invest in human 
capital was low.  Specialization in non-market work in turn decreased their prospects for 
reemployment.  Men, on the other hand, were able to devote their lives entirely to market 
work.  Employers became increasingly more reliant and expected nothing less than workers’ 
complete dedication to their work.  Moreover, employers expected their wives to support this 
complete specialization between the husbands and wives.  In his in-depth study of the lives of 
working men in a Japanese bank, Rohlen (1974) explained: 
 
 
  3The family recognized by the bank is a nuclear family with the wife and children dependent on the husband-
father, who serves as its link with the bank and the outside world.  The family is, thus, a dependency of (the 
bank) and this view reinforces the principle of a strict division of labor between husband and wife.  Properly the 
wife cares for the children and creates a stable and supportive home environment.  The bank would strongly 
discourage any wife from working, for this would take her from her primary roles of mother and wife. (p. 242). 
 
  The employment relationship rested on an implicit contract where workers put in 
long hours and made long-term commitments in exchange for employment security and 
compensation based on length of service with the employer (the so-called seniority wage 
system).  Workers assessed with reasonable trust and certainty that they can depend on long-
term employment and automatic wage growth.  Employment and income security therefore 
made it easier for the worker and his family to predict their economic well-being in the future 
as long as he remained with the firm.  While Rohlen suggests that employers discouraged 
wives from working (see above citation), another interpretation is that employers provided 
employment and income security so that the wives did not have to work.
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  The promotion of “good wife, wise mother” (ryosai kenbo) reinforced, if not 
encouraged, the specialization between the sexes throughout much of the twentieth century.  
The slogan traces its origin to the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), when 
officials in the Ministry of Education began to promote women’s proper role in imperial 
Japan as “managers of domestic affairs in households and nurturers of children”(Uno 1993, 
p.294).  As Uno explained, “although overt attempts by the state to dictate womanhood have 
decreased in intensity since 1945, a transmuted vision of women that often emphasized their 
difference from men as homebound wives and mothers continued to influence state policies 
toward welfare, education, employment, sexuality, and reproduction at least until the late 
1980s” (pp.294-5).  According to Ochiai (1997), “in the postwar period, the state of being a 
housewife became so strongly normative that it was practically synonymous with 
womanhood.” (p.35). 
  4  A notable example of public and private initiatives to influence the management of 
domestic affairs was the New Life Movement, a set of loosely connected initiatives of 
government ministries, women’s organizations, and corporations which started in the late 
1940s (Gordon 1997).
2  The Movement was targeted not at the men but their wives, and 
resembled something of a “social education.”  Companies organized family support groups 
and designated full-time “family organizers” with the aim of educating wives about the 
importance of sex roles, reproduction and the definition of “housewife.”  The wives in turn 
came to believe that active participation in the New Life Movement would help their 
husbands advance at work.  As Gordon (1998) explained, a number of corporations in the U.S. 
and Germany offered social services to employee wives in the postwar period, but none were 
as extensive and sustained as those of Japan’s major corporations:  “Nowhere else did the 
business community with state encouragement organize a national campaign to orchestrate 
training for over one million wives of male industrial workers” (p.78). 
  Tax and benefit programs introduced in the postwar period were legislated assuming 
the male breadwinner model, i.e. a family comprised of a working husband and a non-
working wife.
3  For example, Japan’s tax and pension system discourages wives from earning 
more than 1.3 million yen per year to avoid paying taxes and pension contributions.  The 
current system – sometimes referred to as policies to protect the well-being of housewives 
(Higuchi 1995) – was originally designed to protect married women from declines in 
household income when they moved from market to household work.  However, despite its 
intentions, the underlying assumption of non-working wives (or wives as secondary earners) 
encourages wives to engage in low-paying jobs, and makes them more dependent on their 
husbands.  The weak economic position of wives makes them extremely vulnerable in the 
event of a divorce. 
 
  5DIVORCE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 
  During 1980 and 2003, the divorce rate among married couples in Japan increased 
from 18.3 percent to 33.1 percent.  And yet, despite its recent increase, the divorce rate in 
Japan remains low by international standards (Table 1).  The first column of Table 1 shows 
the divorce rate per 100 married couples in selected countries.  The data can be interpreted as 
the probability that the marriage will result in divorce.
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Despite significant advances in women’s economic positions in the postwar period, 
Japanese women nonetheless maintained traditional views of marriage and the gender division 
of labor.  Table 2 shows the results of the International Comparative Survey Concerning 
Issues Confronting Women conducted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 1993.
5  
Women in Japan were less likely to agree to divorce, and were more likely to view marriage 
as the ultimate form of happiness, show support for the male breadwinner model, and raise 
children according to their gender roles.  Attitudinal surveys taken over time show that both 
men and women in Japan have become more tolerant of divorce over the last 25 years, but 
still remain less tolerant than their Western counterparts.
6  The survey results suggest that the 
legacy of “good wife, wise mother” and the gendered division of labor continue to affect the 
behavior and attitudes of Japanese women today. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Examining data across various countries illuminates many of the unique features 
underlying marriage and divorce in Japan.  We discuss below some of the reasons why the 
  6divorce rate in Japan is low compared to other industrialized economies, and why it is 
becoming more frequent in recent years. 
 
Social norms 
  The low divorce rate in Japan may be an outcome of the social norms and 
expectations that influence the transitions in women’s life course in Japan.  For example, 
Brinton (1992) explained how Japanese women face normative expectations to marry “on 
schedule.”  Using an analogy to Christmas cakes, women who are not married by the age of 
25 become, like Christmas cakes, undesirable “leftover goods,” i.e., their value in the 
marriage market declines considerably.  Moreover, life course transitions must proceed in 
sequence, progressing from school to work then marriage and parenting, and this process is 
irreversible.  Comparing data from the U.S. and Japan, she found that the timing of life course 
transitions such as schooling, marriage, and work was less diverse in Japan than in the United 
States:  Japanese women complete school, get married, and exit the labor force with 
remarkably similar timing, and there is little deviation from the mean. 
  Low variance and irreversibility may explain the low divorce rate and the conformity 
in the timing of marriage and family formation in Japan.  One-parent families and out-of-
wedlock children, for example, are very rare (Table 1).  Cohabitation, although widespread in 
other countries, is virtually non-existent.  In 1999, the cohabitation rate among females in the 
age group 20 to 24 was only 2.3 percent in Japan compared to 77 percent in Sweden and 63 
percent in France (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 1999; United 
Nations 2000).   
  Hence, the divorce rate might be higher in Japan if marriage were to be regarded as 
more reversible.  On the other hand, the divorce rate in Japan might be even lower if 
  7cohabitation or other forms of family formation were to become more acceptable as an 
alternative to marriage. 
  While irreversibility may restrain some couples from getting divorced, it may also 
restrain others from getting married.  Tsuya, Mason and Bumpass (2004) hypothesize that the 
price of marital stability in Japan may be the increasing reluctance of young women to enter 
into marriage, and that this partly explains recent patterns of delayed marriages in Japan.
7 
 
The stigma of divorce 
  Divorce may be more stigmatized in Japan because of the greater importance of 
extended family and kinship ties in marriage.  As exemplified by the expression, “when you 
get married, you get married for the people around you” (Brinton 1993, p.99), marriage in 
Japan has been based less on personal preferences, but more on the wishes of the (extended) 
families and kin.  Compatibility between the families plays an important role in marriages 
especially if they were arranged.  In the event of difficulties confronted in marriage, it is 
common for a woman to seek approval from her family before she decides to divorce (Vogel 
1991). 
  The higher prevalence of arranged marriages and the strength of intergenerational 
ties suggest that marriage in Japan is “a more rigid social institution involving the interests of 
and influences from the extended family and kinship… (in contrast to the marriage in the U.S. 
which is) primarily a matter of individual choice for the happiness and well-being of couples 
and their children” (Bumpass and Choe 2004, p. 20).  The stigma attached to divorce is 
therefore likely to be greater in Japan, because divorce is not just a private affair – a breakup 
of the couples – but a breakup involving the extended families.
8 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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  Numerous studies have documented the extraordinary measures taken by Japanese 
couples whose marriages have deteriorated, but who remain together to avoid the stigma of 
divorce either for themselves, or for the sake of their children.  For example, Yamashita 
(1986) described a case of a “nondivorce divorce” where one couple who had been married 
for 15 years was barely on speaking terms, but the husband would not grant divorce claiming 
it was disgraceful.  Similarly, Iwao (1993) used the expression “divorce within the home,” 
and described one woman who planned her divorce for over 10 years waiting for the right 
timing, in her case, for the children to marry and move out of the household.
9 
  While the relationship between arranged marriages and divorce has not been well 
established, it is conceivable that the recent increase in divorce rates is linked to the decline in 
arranged marriages during the same period (Figure 1).  Arranged marriage was the norm for 
much of the postwar period, and it is only in recent years that the proportion of arranged 
marriages has been overtaken by the proportion of marriages out of love.  The stigma of 
divorce is conceivably weaker if the marriage evolved out of love because the ties between 
the extended families are weaker, and the couple need not be concerned with disgracing the 
reputation of the intermediary.  As Iwao (1993) explained, “divorce is now easier because it is 
considered a private (i.e., between the couple themselves), rather than a family (in the sense of 
the extended family) matter” (p. 119), and couples feel less inclined to “keep up 
appearances.”  She concluded by explaining that the divorce rate in Japan will rise gradually 
as the social sanctions and obstacles against divorce are lifted. 
 
Economic dependency 
  Women’s economic dependency in marriage is a crucial determinant of divorce in 
contemporary societies.  Economic independence is determined by earnings power, and 
  9influences each spouse’s ability to walk away from marriage.  Using the analogy to 
Hirschman’s “exit, voice and loyalty,” Hobson (1990) explains that women with low earnings 
potential have weaker voice and fewer exit possibilities.  The greater likelihood of divorce in 
contemporary societies is the outcome of the decline in loyalty between spouses, and 
women’s lower economic dependency which have lowered the costs of exiting marriages. 
  Specialization within the household limits women’s opportunities in the labor market 
and makes them financially vulnerable in the event of a divorce.  As Oppenheimer (1997) 
explains, “extreme sex-role specialization in marriage is essentially a high-risk and inflexible 
family strategy unless accompanied by supplementary support mechanisms” (p. 447).  In this 
regard, marriage is similar to an implicit long-term contract that protects women from their 
husbands against abandonment and other adversities (Becker 1993).  Advances in women’s 
educational attainment and labor force participation increase their earnings capacity, reduce 
the advantages of the sexual division of labor in marriage, and make women less dependent 
on their husbands.  Women with higher earnings are therefore more prone to divorce, and this 
pattern is consistent with the evidence from other countries.
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  The costs and benefits of marriage are determined by the nature of investments 
undertaken in marriage.  England and Kilbourne (1990) distinguish between general and 
relation-specific investments; general investments comprise education and other investments 
in human capital that will benefit the marriage but that are not specific to the marriage.  In 
contrast, relation-specific investments such as the socialization of children and forming 
emotional attachments to in-laws are not portable or transferable outside of the marriage.  In 
general, women make more relation-specific investments and less general investments than 
men.  This asymmetry contributes to women’s higher dependency on their husbands, and 
weakens their ability to walk away from marriage (England and Kilbourne 1990). 
  10  Mainly as the result of the specialization between the sexes, Japanese women still 
remain highly dependent on their husbands.  Women’s economic positions are still vastly 
inferior to men’s, as indicated by various international comparisons that consistently rank 
Japan low on the gender equality indicators.
11  In comparison to the United States and Europe, 
married women in Japan make less general investments because they are assumed to be 
secondary earners, and they make more relation-specific investments because the importance 
of maintaining relationships between the extended families is primarily the responsibility of 
wives. 
  A notable example of gender inequality in Japan concerns the labor force 
participation of women over their lifecycle.  Low variance and age-congruity that characterize 
lifecourse transitions in Japan lead to remarkably similar patterns in the timing of women’s 
entry and exit from the labor force.  The three key transitions – entry into the labor force after 
schooling, exit upon marriage or childbearing, and re-entry upon completion of some family 
responsibilities – progress in sequence and on schedule over the lifecourse, and result in the 
so-called M-curve of women’s labor force participation over their lifecycle (Figure 1).   
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In particular, the massive exit from the labor force upon childbearing is one of the most 
pronounced in the industrialized economies, and leads to an acute drop in labor force 
participation among women in the 30-39 age group.  As shown in Table 1, the proportion of 
working mothers (defined as the share of mothers with children under six years in the labor 
force) was only 34 percent in Japan, which is the lowest among the countries reported here.  
In other words, as late as 1999, two out of three mothers in Japan were fully specialized in the 
household, and were fully dependent on their husbands for family earnings.  Women’s high 
  11economic dependency on their husbands makes them financially vulnerable in the event of 
divorce, and this is one of the strongest deterrents of divorce in Japan. 
  In the postwar period, the proportion of women advancing to university education in 
Japan increased gradually, and the gender gap in educational attainment and wages has 
narrowed.  Women are better endowed with general human capital and therefore are less 
dependent on their husbands.  The cost of exiting marriage is now lower which may explain 
the greater likelihood of divorce in recent years. 
  The rise in the divorce rate in the 1990s coincides with the widely publicized view of 
the demise of lifetime employment.
12  The economic stagnation of the 1990s and threats of 
restructuring and downsizing may have compelled some housewives to reconsider their total 
dependency on their husbands.  The percentage of mothers who continue working after 
having children, and the percentage of working women in the 30-39 age group grew steadily 
throughout the 1990s leading to the flattening out of the M-curve distribution of women’s 
labor force participation (Japan Institute of Labour 2003).  The 1990s therefore exposed the 
weakness of the specialization model:  Complete specialization between the sexes entails 
considerable risks (Oppenheimer 1997). 
 
An inherent problem is that the temporary or permanent loss of one specialist in a family can mean that functions 
vital to the well-being of the complementary specialist and children are not being performed.  Husbands/fathers 
can die or become ill or disabled; they can lose their jobs and have difficulty finding another one…  The result is 
that the family is left without its major source of income.  Except for employment-related shifts, there are similar 
problems involving the wife-mother specialist.  In that case, there could be no one to take care of the children or 
the home. (p. 447). 
 
  Women’s decreasing dependency on their husbands may be linked to the rise in 
divorce rates in the 1990s, suggesting that the patterns of divorce may have a transitory 
component.  Employment security and automatic wage growth could no longer be taken for 
granted; the future of the family’s well-being was no longer predictable nor stable.  The 
prospect of economic uncertainty “pushed” many housewives into the labor force, which in 
  12turn lowered their economic dependency, and gave them greater voice to walk away from 
marriage.  It is thus likely conceivable that the women will be “pulled out” of the labor force 
if the economy recovers and employment stability becomes the norm once again. 
 
Role of the welfare state 
  The social structure of modern society differs markedly from that of primitive tribes 
and villages in that traditional family roles are being replaced by welfare services (Coleman 
1990).  This transition can be seen as a natural consequence of economic development where 
interpersonal relations are replaced with institutions more complementary to a market-based 
economy (Stiglitz 2000).  Caring for the children or the aged, for example, has long been the 
primary function of families, but is now increasingly subsidized by the state, especially in the 
so-called welfare state economies of Scandinavia.  For example, in Sweden, generous 
maternal (and paternal) leave benefits and subsidized childcare programs allow women to 
balance their work and family obligations.  These benefits lead to a higher proportion of 
working mothers in Sweden as illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 2.  Further, women who exit 
marriages in Sweden are not forced into poverty because the welfare state provides a wide 
safety net for single mothers that includes income transfers for children, housing subsidies, 
and reduced costs for daycare and other social services (Hobson 1990). 
  In contrast, the male breadwinner model that characterized postwar economic 
development in Japan assumed that the welfare of the families was a private affair, and the 
responsibility of the wives.  The lack of welfare services in Japan discourages women from 
seeking full-time jobs, increases wives’ dependence on their husbands and further deters 
women from divorce.  Less support for the welfare of single mothers in particular may 
explain the lower incidence of one-parent families in Japan relative to the countries of 
Scandinavia (Table 1). 
  13  The strength of intergenerational ties and support is one example where the extended 
family substitutes for the welfare state in Japan.  Co-residence with parents or in-laws allows 
wives to alleviate the burden of household responsibilities with the extended family.  Sasaki 
(2002) finds that co-residence increases the probability of labor-force participation among 
married women with young children (under six years).  
 
Demographic change 
  One of the noticeable patterns in the postwar period is the increasing rate of divorce 
among older couples.  The proportion of divorce cases among couples married for over 20 
years increased from 3.1 percent in 1947 to 16 percent in 1996 (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare statistics cited in Iwai [1999]).  In 1970, the average duration of marriage at the time 
of divorce was 6.8 years, but by the mid-1990s it had reached 10 years indicating that many 
more couples who had been married for a decade or more were starting to divorce (Curtin 
2002).  Advances in the economic position of women and the decline in the stigma of divorce 
as previously discussed are some of the factors behind this trend.   
  Improvement in life expectancy may be another source of late-life divorce.  The 
average Japanese woman can now expect to live until the age of 85.  If the husband retires at 
the age of 60, this means that the typical couple can expect to live together for over twenty 
years after retirement.  Since men have devoted most of their lives to work, many Japanese 
couples are not accustomed to spending so much time with their spouse in close proximity.  If 
the couple does not get on well or one has less tolerance than the other, then increases in 
longevity increase the possibility of a late-life divorce (Curtin 2002).  Iwao (1993), for 
example, documented one case of a “retirement divorce” where the wife left her husband on 
the day of his retirement.  Although such extreme cases tend to be overblown by the media, 
  14there is now growing anecdotal evidence that retirement divorce has become more common 
than it has been in the past.
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  The increasing divorce rate is also associated with declining fertility, although the 
causation is not clear.  With the secular decline in the birthrate, the couple is, at any given age, 
less likely to have any children, and is more likely to have fewer children.  Children constitute 
a prime example of investment in “marital-specific” capital (Becker 1993).  Because one of 
the main costs of divorce is the cost imposed on the children, having fewer children or no 
children at all lowers the cost of divorce.  Indeed, divorce is less likely in the presence of 
children, especially young children (Ono 1998, Waite and Lillard 1991), although this effect 
is somewhat endogenous:  “Expectations about divorce are partly self-fulfilling because a 
higher expected probability of divorce reduces investments in (marital) specific capital and 
thereby raises the actual probability” (Becker 1993, p. 329).  In other words, if women 
perceive that the marriage is more likely to end in divorce, then they are also less likely to 
have children. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  The divorce rate in Japan is rising.  There is no single cause for the weakening of the 
institution of marriage in Japan.  Rather, the changing pattern of marriage and divorce is the 
outcome of the dynamic interactions between economic development and demographic 
change at the macro-level, and changes in social norms and attitudes that govern the behavior 
of individuals at the micro-level.   
  One of the lessons from the United States and Europe concerns the tradeoff between 
gender equality and marital stability.  The drive towards equal status between the sexes 
narrows the dependency between the spouses, and offsets the costs and benefits of marriage.  
Lower dependency allows greater voice, and lowers the cost of exiting a marriage.  The 
  15diversity of family forms such as civil unions and cohabitation allows couples to choose 
alternatives to marriage, which in turn weakens the institution of marriage.  The divorce rate 
in Japan is low compared to Western societies because dependency between the spouses is 
greater, alternatives to marriage are fewer, and the legacy of the traditional gender division of 
labor continues to influence the actions and attitudes of men and women.   
  Achieving gender equality is now a key policy issue in Japan.  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law was introduced in 1986 and revised in 1999; more recently, 
initiatives have been introduced to eliminate gender bias in the tax and benefit system, and to 
improve the welfare of single-parent families.  These initiatives are all carefully modeled 
from their predecessors in the United States and Europe.  In other words, gender equality in 
Japan will be achieved by emulating aspects of the U.S. and European model.   
  There are, however, counteracting pressures to preserve the institution of marriage 
and family.  A notable example of this concerns the debate concerning whether spouses 
should be able to keep their family names after marriage.  Originally proposed in 1991, the 
issue has not yet been resolved and the debate is ongoing (Iwai 1999).  The extent to which 
Japan internalizes Western values while preserving traditional values will have a profound 
influence on the future of marriage and family formation in Japan. 
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1 This point is explicitly made in Ishizaka (1973) who explains that an employment relationship must take into 
consideration the well-being of the family; workers must be compensated sufficiently to sustain a reasonable 
quality of life, not only for themselves but also for their families.   
 
2 The current discussion about the New Life Movement draws significantly from Gordon (1997, 1998). 
 
3 See Ono and Rebick (2003) for review of literature concerning the impact of tax and benefit schemes on 
women’s labor force participation in Japan. 
 
4 Another common statistic used in international comparisons is the divorce rate per 1000 persons.  However, 
while alternative forms of marriage such as cohabitation and civil unions may be widespread in other countries, 
marriage and family formation in Japan is still relatively homogenous.  The high proportion of cohabiting 
couples in other countries, for example, does not appear in the divorce statistics in the event of a breakup when 
they are reported as divorce per 1000 persons.  Hence the divorce rate per 100 married couples is a more 
appropriate measure when accounting for the diversity of marriage and family formation. 
 
5 Results are based on a random sample of women aged 20 years or older in the six countries.   
 
6 Survey results from the Prime Minister’s Office (cited in Iwai 2002) indicate that the proportion who agreed to 
the statement, “it’s better to seek divorce if unsatisfied with one’s spouse” increased from 21 to 53 percent 
among men, and from 21 to 55 percent among women between 1972 and 1997.  See also Retherford et al (2001) 
for an international comparison of these survey results. 
 
7 Japan is now one of the latest-marrying populations in the world.  Between 1975 and 1995, the mean age at 
marriage increased from 24.5 to 27.7 years for women and 27.6 to 30.7 years for men; during the same period, 
the proportion who will never marry increased from 5 to 15 percent for women and from 6 to 22 percent for men 
(Retherford et al 2001). 
 
8 The social sanctions for divorce may not be symmetrical for men and women.  For example, Iwao (1993) 
explained that divorced women in the prewar period were viewed as “damaged goods” because women were 
expected to be virgins at marriage. 
 
9 Similarly, Bryant (2001) describes one woman who waited for eight years for her two sons to start their careers 
before she initiated the divorce. 
 
10 Becker (1993) explained that the growth in the earnings of women has been a major cause (and also a result) 
of the growth in divorce in the U.S.   
 
11 See for example, statistics from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). 
 
12 The empirical evidence on the decline of lifetime employment is mixed, and it is hasty to assume that the 
institution of lifetime employment is defunct.  See for example, Kato (2001) and Rebick (2001) who argue that 
there were little signs of change in the Japanese employment system during the 1990s.  See also chapter by 
Moriguchi and Ono (forthcoming in this volume) for discussion concerning the future of lifetime employment. 
 
13 See for example, Sakurai, Joji. “Divorce rate for Japan’s elderly couples is growing.” Associated Press. March 
19, 2000, and “Divorces hit all-time high in Japan, as more middle-aged couples split.” Canadian Press. 
September 17, 2003. 
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Table 1  Divorce, marriage and family statistics among selected countries (%) 
 
  Divorce per 100 
married couples 
1  One parent families 
2 Out of wedlock 
children 
2  Working mothers 
1* 
Japan                           33.1   4                           1.1                           33.7 
U.S.                          50.6   25                         25.0                           61.2 
Belgium                          59.8   13                         11.0                           66.2 
Sweden                           53.9   19                         47.0                           76.1 
Finland                          53.2   - -                          58.8 
U.K.                          52.7   19                         30.0                           55.5 
Austria                          49.8   - -                          66.0 
Luxembourg                          48.0   10                         12.9                           56.8 
Germany                           44.3   12                         15.5                           52.8 
France                           40.9   13                         28.4                           58.6 
Norway                          39.7   19                         40.9                           72.8 
Netherlands                          39.3   10                         11.4                           66.4 
Denmark                          37.5   18                         46.0                           74.3 
Portugal                          30.0   6                         14.7                           69.8 
Spain                          16.5   5                         10.0                           43.3 
Greece                          15.4   5                           2.0                           46.6 
Italy                          12.5   7                           6.3                           46.9 
[SOURCE:  
1 OECD (2003), 
2 Whiteford and Bradshaw (1994)] 
* Out of wedlock children defined as the number of births outside of marriage divided by the total number of 
births.  Working mothers defined as the proportion of mothers with children under 6 years old in the labor 
force.  
Table 2  Views on marriage and family among selected countries – Women only (%) 
 
 Japan  U.S.  U.K.  France  Germany  Sweden
If and when one cannot find satisfaction with a 
mate, it is better to get a divorce 
 
44.6 69.9 82.8 83.1  80.9  65.3 
All things considered, women’s happiness lies in 
marriage, so it’s better for women to marry 
 
78.2 28.8 37.0 51.8  40.9  18.4 
The husband should be the breadwinner, and the 
wife should stay at home 
 
55.6 23.7 20.3 22.4  24.8  12.8 
To teach a boy to behave like a boy and a girl to 
behave like a girl 
 
45.6 28.2 15.8 24.1  14.8  6.3 


















[SOURCE:  National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 1997] 
* The sum of love and arranged marriages do not add up to 100 because of the 
small percentage of persons in the “other” category. 
 






































SOURCE:  ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, selected years (1997 to 1999) 
 
Figure 2  Women’s labor force participation rates in selected countries 
 